



Washington, D.C. 20520

September 8, 1978

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TO : [REDACTED] Deputy to the DCI for Resource Management

FROM : William G. Bowdler, *44*
Director of Intelligence and Research

SUBJECT : Satellite Reconnaissance Security Policy
Alternatives

REFERENCE: Your memo of September 5 on this subject

Our problem with the draft issue paper lies in the artificial link which it makes between declassification of the "fact of" and the possible subsequent declassification of selected imagery. We also have a problem with its implicit conclusion that limited declassification of the "fact of" will generate irresistible demands to declassify imagery. Although we recognize that these two issues are related, we believe they can and should be dealt with separately. If careful consideration is given to the development and implementation of a decision to declassify the "fact of", INR believes that pressures to release actual imagery can be avoided.

Finally, we do not agree (as indicated in Section C of the issues paper) that declassifying the "fact of" without releasing imagery would be of only limited value in the SALT context. At present, Administration spokesmen are restricted to using the euphemism "national technical means" when describing our ability to verify compliance with a SALT Agreement. This term has little meaning to the general public. Moreover, the necessity to talk by indirection conveys

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to the public an impression of evasiveness and of trying to cover up an inherently weak case for SALT. Open, direct reference to satellite photoreconnaissance would avoid this problem and could be done without the release of actual imagery or of any other information about our satellite reconnaissance capabilities.

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